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Consent, Culpability, and the Law of Rape
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan*
Our conception of sexual assault is undergoing a transformation. The most
critical shift is the move away from force as a necessary element of rape and
toward the view that sex without consent is itself a serious crime. As Deborah
Tuerkheimer notes, the prevalent view is that “it is virtually axiomatic that
nonconsensual sex is rape; the challenge outstanding is to define consent.”1
Although only some states currently adopt a requirement of affirmative consent2—
that the consenter must say “yes” by words or conduct—it is reasonable to predict
future adoptions for two reasons. First, as colleges and universities are required
under Title IX to promulgate sexual assault regulations, these institutions seem
particularly tempted by affirmative consent standards.3 Indeed, over 800 colleges
and universities have adopted affirmative consent provisions.4
Second, affirmative consent standards are advocated for not just by ivory
tower scholars. These standards are also under consideration as part of the revised
Model Penal Code. The Model Penal Code, arguably one of the most influential
and successful law reform efforts, has one significant blemish: its sexual assault
provisions—provisions which include a marital rape exemption and adopt a
gendered view of rape.5 The American Law Institute now has a group working on
Harrison Robertson Professor of Law, Caddell and Chapman Professor of Law, University
of Virginia. For comments on this paper, I thank Richard Bonnie, Rachel Harmon, Debbie Hellman,
Ruth Mason, and Rich Schragger as well as the participants in the faculty workshop at the University
of Virginia. I also benefitted greatly from conversations with Ken Simons. For research assistance, I
thank John Elliott, Claire Mitchell, and Alyson Sandler.
1
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape On and Off Campus, 65 EMORY L.J. 1, 3 (2015); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 17 (AM. LAW. INST., Discussion
Draft No. 2, 2015) (“the evolution of reform toward a more consent-based conception of the offense
has been unmistakable, not only in the United States but throughout the world.”).
2
E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3251(3) (2005) (“‘Consent’ means words or actions by a
person indicating a voluntary agreement to engage in a sexual act.”) (emphasis added); State ex rel
M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992).
3
E.g., OFFICE OF POLICY AND EFFICIENCY, UNIV. OF COLORADO, APS 5014 SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT http://www.cu.edu/ope/aps/5014 (Effective July 1, 2015) (“Consent is clear, knowing and
voluntary words or actions which create mutually understandable clear permission regarding willingness to
engage in, and the conditions of, sexual activity. Consent must be active; silence by itself cannot be interpreted as
consent.”).
4
Jake
New,
The
“Yes
Means
Yes”
World,
SLATE
(Oct.
17,
2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/inside_higher_ed/2014/10/affirmative_consent_what_will_yes_means_yes_me
an_for_sex_on_college_campuses.html.
5
See Deborah W. Denno, Why the Model Penal Code’s Sexual Offense Provisions Should Be Pulled
and Replaced, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207, 210–13 (2003).
*
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substantially revising the Model Penal Code’s sexual assault provisions,6 and, the
definition and role of consent are among the central topics under consideration.7
The “women say ‘no’ when they mean ‘yes’” trope is as tired as it is familiar.
That said, the relationship between different conceptions of consent and different
assessments of the defendant’s culpability remains an important one. If the
criminal law is going to label someone a criminal and potentially incarcerate her,
and if universities are going to expel their students for sexual assault, it is essential
that the interplay between conceptions of consent and the accused’s
blameworthiness be fully examined.8
This Article seeks to explore the relationship between consent and culpability.
The goal is to present a thorough exposition of the tradeoffs at play when the law
adopts different conceptions of consent. Part I begins by describing the
relationship between culpability, wrongdoing, permissibility, and consent. It then
argues that the best conception of consent—one that reflects what consent really
is—is the conception of willed acquiescence. That is, an internal choice to allow
contact—a decision that “this is okay with me”—is all that is morally required for
one person to contact another. Part I further maintains that an expression of
consent is not necessary to capture those culpable actors who proceed when they
do not believe that they have consent, as attempt liability remains available.
Culpable actors can be captured without altering the conception of consent to do
so. Finally, although Part I endorses consent as willed acquiescence, Part I sets
forth alternative conceptions of consent. As will be seen in later Parts, most
conceptions of what consent is are inconsistent with affirmative consent
formulations.
Part II discusses a defendant-protecting motive for shifting to expressive
standards for consent. However, to the extent this move is thought to be
defendant-protecting, as it authorizes contact based on reasonable appearances, this
goal can be accomplished with mens rea provisions. Requiring an external
manifestation is unnecessary.
Part III then turns to the current victim-protecting impetus for affirmative
expression standards, specifically, requirements that the victim by words or
conduct said “yes” or “no.” Part III argues that affirmative expression standards
suppress the underlying moral question in favor of a new rule that commentators
wish the populace to follow. This transition means that a defendant who
See Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault and Related Offenses, AM. LAW INST.,
https://www.ali.org/projects/show/sexual-assault-and-related-offenses/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
7
Under one version of the proposed provisions, sex in the face of refusal is a third-degree
felony and sex without an affirmative “yes” (by words or conduct) is a misdemeanor. MODEL PENAL
CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 2 (AM. LAW. INST., Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015)
(setting forth proposed § 213.2).
8
Certainly these are different sanctions by very different institutions and should be treated as
such. I return to whether colleges are different in Part VI. However, the first question is what
consent is, and that question does not differ between the two.
6
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reasonably believed the victim acquiesced will still be guilty of sexual assault—all
the defendant will be permitted to argue about is whether the victim’s behavior
constituted the required expression. This could lead to strict liability, as it allows
for the possibility of condemning someone who did not do anything morally
culpable. Part III also notes that, at best, affirmative expression standards could be
construed as adopting negligence per se rules; however, negligence liability is rare
for serious crimes. Finally, it argues that “only yes means yes” standards threaten
to blur the line between consent and requests, ultimately employing the criminal
law in the service of promoting virtuous or ideal conduct rather than simply
prohibiting wrongful conduct.
Part IV addresses questions about placing affirmative expression requirements
into a criminal code. It argues that “no means no” standards are under-inclusive
and that “only yes means yes” standards, so long as they allow conduct to count as
affirmative consent, will fail to protect victims or give guidance to potential
defendants. Conduct is simply too ambiguous. Part IV then raises problems with
grading and distinguishing offenses. Specifically, under affirmative expression
models, knowing and negligent actors appear to violate the same law. Not only
does this mean that the criminal law will necessarily over or under punish one
group, but it also yields that both types of actors are treated as equally culpable.
Such a code fails to distinguish actors according to their blameworthiness and to
punish them proportionately. Finally, this Part suggests the compromise solution
of an affirmative defense when the defendant honestly (and/or reasonably) believes
there is willed acquiescence.
Finally, Part V addresses the applicability of affirmative consent standards to
colleges and universities. Although these institutions' reforms may be able to
avoid some of the problems of criminal law, Part V argues that colleges must solve
the “intoxicated yes” problem, a problem that will exist even under affirmative
consent requirements.
I. WHAT IS CONSENT?
A. Some Terminological Preliminaries
Let me begin by ensuring that we are all on the same terminological page.
Initially, it is important to distinguish between wrongdoing and culpability. Take,
for example, the simple case of a person who purposefully kills another. We can
say two things here: First, the defendant engaged in a wrongful action (killing
another person).9 Second, the defendant was culpable (he acted purposefully).10

Heidi M. Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1551, 1558 (1999) (“Moral wrongdoing consists of doing an action that violates the maxims of
our best moral theory—whatever that theory may be, be it consequentialist or deontological.”).
9
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Importantly, wrongdoing and culpability can come apart. A defendant who
accidentally runs over another may engage in wrongdoing, but is not culpable. In
these instances, unless the criminal law allows for strict liability, the defendant will
not be guilty of a crime. In contrast, the criminal law will punish culpability
without wrongdoing. If the defendant, with the intent to kill, shoots someone, but
it turns out the person is already dead, the defendant may still be punished for
attempted murder. The defendant did not commit the wrong of killing another
human being, but she is still culpable.
Another terminological clarification is necessary, and it concerns the meaning
of the word, “permissibility.” One might think that permissibility tracks either
culpability or wrongdoing.11 I believe that permissibility should track wrongdoing;
that is, permissibility should depend on the underlying act’s nature and quality and
not the defendant’s culpability. It is rare that a mental state affects whether the
action is or is not permissible.12 But one need not accept my claim here. The
debate over which aspect of the defendant’s conduct the word “permissibility”
applies to is something we need not resolve for purposes of this Article. If you
think permissibility tracks culpability, then you will take culpable actions to be
impermissible, but nothing turns on the disagreement as to what “permissibility”
applies to. I take it that culpability is sufficient for punishment and wrongdoing is
not. Thus, even if I claim that an act is permissible because it is not wrongdoing, I
do not imply that the defendant is not still culpable, blameworthy, and punishable.
Indeed, in my view, the criminal law ought to punish attempts at the same level as
completed crimes.13 Hopefully, this clarifies for the reader what is and is not at
stake when I claim an act is permissible.
With this exposition in mind, then, we can consider the normative force of
consent. Here’s a first pass: Consent takes an action that was wrongful, and
renders it not wrongful because it no longer violates the consenter’s rights. Now,
that is slightly oversimplistic because the action might still be wrongful for other
reasons. For example, it might be wrongful because it violates a third person’s
rights. A man who has consensual sex with his mistress has not committed rape,

Id. (“Moral culpability consists in intending to do an action that is wrongful, knowing that
one will do an action that is wrongful, or failing to infer from available evidence that one will do an
action that is wrongful.”).
11
Hurd places permissible within the category of “right action.” Id. at 1560 n.25. Alan
Wertheimer, in contrast, appears to think that an action is not permissible because the actor is legally
or morally culpable. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 146–47 (2003).
12
See LARRY ALEXANDER AND KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 92–93, 97 (2009) (suggesting that self-defense may require knowledge of
the attack but rejecting the Doctrine of Double Effect).
13
Id. at 171 (providing arguments for why attempts are not less blameworthy than completed
offenses).
10
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but he has still committed adultery and therefore has acted wrongfully.14
Importantly, his action does not wrong his mistress since it does not violate her
rights. If a boxer consents to being punched by another boxer, he still has suffered
the harm of a bloody nose, a harm that the consentee boxer must still take into
account.15 But I am unconcerned with special cases here. All I will focus on is the
permissibility/non-wrongfulness of sexual relations when Joe consents to sex with
Suzie, and Suzie consents to sex with Joe. 16 Ceteris paribus, consent renders that
contact non-wrongful when it was previously wrongful. The relevant question is,
“What is consent?”
B. The Ontology of Consent
In asking how to formulate consent in a statute, we must first ask what
consent is. Even if we determine that consent is a mental act that need not be
expressed, the law might opt for prophylactic rules that require an expression
because these rules might serve as victim-protecting or defendant-protecting
proxies. For instance, a rule that forbids sex with a minor under 16 is using age as
a proxy for incapacity, rather than assessing capacity directly. Here, we need to
know exactly what consent is, and we can then ask (1) whether we want to define
it legally as something other than what it is and (2) what interests are at stake in
opting for an alternative legal definition.

14
Heidi M. Hurd, The Normative Force of Consent, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON THE
ETHICS OF CONSENT (Peter Schaber ed., forthcoming 2016).
15
That is, even if left unprotected by a right, there is still a residual harm. Cf. HELEN FROWE,
DEFENSIVE KILLING 209 (2014) (arguing that in the self-defense context, even when aggressors forfeit
rights, harm to them must be taken into account).
16
Michelle Madden Dempsey and Jonathan Herring argue that sexual intercourse requires not
only consent but also some positive reasons that outweigh the risks and injuries of sexual intercourse
(ranging from disease, to pregnancy, to physical injury inherent in vaginal intercourse). Michelle
Madden Dempsey and Jonathan Herring, Why Sexual Penetration Requires Justification, 27 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 467, 467–69 (2007). This would not require requests but might require that the
putative defendant’s pleasure, the relationship’s stability, and other goods outweigh the minor
physical injuries and the risk of pregnancy and disease. That is, although consent can drop the
wrongfulness that comes from violating the person’s autonomy, further good reasons are needed to
justify the harm or risk of harms. To them, sex is like the boxing example. Two points. First, once
there is consent to the sex act, then the question is simply whether these physical injuries are justified.
This is arguably covered by MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2015); that is, it ought
to then be evaluated on terms of whether one can consent to other sorts of physical harms where we
answer “yes” to boxing and “no” to some amputations. Second, within the realm of average risks, we
might simply think that when there is consent it is too invasive for the law to do an all-thingsconsidered justification analysis unless there is force that extends beyond that inherent in sexual
intercourse. Cf. Vera Bergelson, The Meaning of Consent, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 171, 178 (2014)
(arguing that because sex is morally neutral, “attitudinal” consent is sufficient but maintaining that
harms that require a justification (such as homicide or battery) also require knowledge of the
justifying circumstances, and such knowledge implicitly requires that consent be expressed).
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Thus, the argument here serves as a key starting point for determining what is
at stake with proposed alternative definitions. This Part begins by suggesting that
consent is an internal mental choice—willed acquiescence, as this is the view that
best comports with the consenter’s autonomy. It also argues that this view that is
in accord with tort law, and that law reformers, particularly the American Law
Institute, should be cognizant of how consent is understood in other domains. This
Part then suggests that a performative view is normatively unattractive, and indeed,
not the conception that reformers truly adopt. Finally, this section suggests even if
consent must be manifested, silence under certain conditions can suffice.
Although I find the mental-act view of consent to be most perspicuous, even those
tempted by the expressive view will see the way that law reforms threaten to
diverge from what consent actually is.
As Peter Westen thoroughly clarifies in his magisterial book, we use the term
“consent” to cover different things. We have different conceptions: There is the
subjective mental state, which Westen denotes as “factual attitudinal consent,”
(hereafter I will refer to it as “willed acquiescence” or “assent”);17 there is the
expression of that state (saying yes—expressing assent);18 there is the requirement
of having or expressing that state under conditions of sufficient freedom (no gun to
the head) and information (not mistaken that consentee is husband), such that the
assent is normatively transformative;19 and finally, there are times when we impute
consent—where consent to a is held to be consent to b. Such a position would
include not only the infamous marital rape exemption but also claims that consent
to play football includes the consent to rough tackling.20 Although we sometimes
use the word “consent” despite the absence of sufficient freedom or information—
“she only consented because he put a knife to her throat”—it is arguably preferable
to use “assent” for choices or expressions that fall short of being normatively
efficacious.21 Nevertheless, because this Article is unconcerned with conditions
that might prevent assent from being effective and thus constituting “consent,” I
will use “consent” and “assent” somewhat interchangeably.

PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT:
AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 4 (2004).
17

THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT

Westen dubs this, “factual expressive consent.” Id. at 5.
Westen calls this “prescriptive attitudinal” or “expressive consent.” Id. at 177.
20
Id. at 271.
21
Our use of the term “consent” to cover both the acquiescence and that acquiescence plus
normative constraints can lead to confusion. Indeed, we might find it more normatively attractive to
deny the label of “consent” to anything that falls short of being normatively efficacious. So, for
instance, Heidi Hurd claims that “coerced consent is no consent at all.” Heidi M. Hurd, Was the Frog
Prince Sexually Molested? A Review of Peter Westen’s The Logic of Consent, 103 MICH. L. REV.
1329, 1332 (2005); accord Kenneth W. Simons, The Conceptual Structure of Consent in Criminal
Law, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 577, 585 (2006) (book review).
18
19
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The starting question of “what consent is,” has three potential answers.22
First, consent could be what Westen dubs “factual attitudinal consent”—a mental
act.23 Second, consent could be a performative, words or conduct that by their
expression, authorize the contact. Third, consent could require both the mental act
and some manifestation thereof.
Which conception reflects the ontology of consent? That is, what actually is
it? The question is sometimes posed as, “Is consent something you do or
something you feel?” This is a somewhat unfair way to present the problem. We
do plenty of mental acts. For instance, add two plus two. You can probably do
this without expressing anything. Now, decide what type of ice cream you are
going to buy at Ben and Jerry’s. No expression needed there. Now decide how
long you are going to spend reading this article. Again, an outward manifestation
is completely unnecessary. We engage in mental acts all the time. So, the
question should not be whether consent is something you do. It most certainly is.
The question is whether consent needs to be manifested.
What is consent? To start, it is a normative power. Hohfeld nicely unpacked
what lawyers take to be “rights” into different sorts of normative relationships.
You might have a claim right that I not harm you, to which I then have a
correlative duty not to interfere with or touch your body. If one can alter these
relations, one is said to have a power. And if one is subject to such alterations, one
has a liability.24 What is at stake with respect to consent is how one exercises a
power.25 Alice has a duty not to touch Betty, and Betty has a right not to be
touched. However, if Betty consents to Alice touching her, then Alice does not
wrong Betty. Alice has the power to alter her normative relation to Betty by
consenting to the contact. Other normative powers include promising and
abandonment. Abandonment is the power whereby we relinquish our claim rights
to property. Promising is the power by which we create new duties for ourselves
and new claims rights in others. One question, then, is whether one can exercise a
normative power without any physical manifestation.
Promising best supports a performative model.26 Promising is an instance
where “saying makes it so.” To promise is, by words or conduct, to commit

22

See WERTHEIMER, supra note 11, at 144 (setting out subjective, performative, and hybrid

views).
See WESTEN, supra note 17, at 4.
WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED TO JUDICIAL
REASONING 34 (2d ed. 1920).
25
See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY LAW 16 (1997) (“A normative power is the
normative ability or capacity to change one’s own or another’s normative position by modifying,
creating, or destroying rules, rights, duties, or other powers.”).
26
See Tom Dougherty, Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication, 3 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 224,
234 (2015) (arguing that consent requires communication because promises do). Dougherty does not
seek to reconcile his view with the normative power of abandonment.
23
24
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oneself to performing the action. An uncommunicated promise is a silent vow, but
it does not create a duty that the promisor owes to the promisee.27
In contrast, abandonment seems perfectly consistent with a mental act view.
As Eduardo Peñalver notes, “[r]ather than understanding this physical separation
as an essential component of the legal concept of abandonment, however, it would
be more accurate to view the intent unilaterally to terminate rights as definitive of
abandonment[.]”28 Although it is admittedly more difficult to abandon property
that is on your own property,29 the idea that merely by choosing to leave your
bicycle unclaimed, you can renounce your rights seems correct. A person who
then took “your bike” would not be taking the property of another because you had
relinquished your right to it—irrespective of whether you said or did anything to so
communicate your abandonment. (If the person believed he was stealing your
bike, he might be liable for an attempt. More on that possibility below.) Of
course, even if the normative power of abandonment requires only the decision to
relinquish one’s rights, the law might adopt prophylactic rules. Indeed, property
abandonment is heavily regulated because of evidential concerns. The legal
system requires both an intention to abandon and an act of relinquishment.30
At this point, the goal of the discussion is simply to argue that the idea of a
normative power need not entail a communication. If one thinks that one can
abandon without communication, there is no reason one cannot likewise consent in
a similar way. To understand consent as a normative power, then, does not require
us to understand consent as something that is expressed.
1. The Argument that Consent is Willed Acquiescence
To determine whether consent is more like promising or abandonment, the
critical inquiry is whether it is the case that one is no longer wronged when one
makes an internal decision, or whether that decision needs to be communicated.
Our normative powers to promise, abandon, and consent are grounded in our
autonomy. “The idea that an agent can intentionally form an obligation through
Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603,
1620 (2009). One could take the view that silent vows are promises. That would make the case
easier for me.
28
Eduardo Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV. 191, 197 (2010); see
also PENNER, supra note 25, at 79 (“Abandonment is a permanent decision not to take advantage of
the general duty in rem prohibiting interference in respect of a particular thing abandoned.”).
29
Indeed, the extreme difficulty in abandoning property because you either own the property
on which it is placed or someone else does, has led Eduardo Peñalver to conclude that abandonment
is quite rare and conveyances are the actual norm. Peñalver, supra note 28, at 203. For an alternative
perspective, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 414–415
(2010).
30
1 AM. JUR. 2d, Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 10 (2012); Linscomb v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. 199 F.2d 431. 435 (8th Cir. 1952); Cash v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 123
Cal. App. 3d 974, 978 (1981).
27
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the exercise and expression of her will alone (and not by first transforming the
state of affairs around her) comes part and parcel with any plausible conception of
an autonomous agent.”31 The power to promise is necessary to have rich and
fulfilling relations with others.32 The power to abandon is tied to our autonomy.
Our lives would be quite encumbered if we could not choose to sever relations
with things we no longer wish to have.33 So, too, we could not lead morally
fulfilling lives if we could not choose to allow others to cross our boundaries. It
would be a lonely and harsh existence if others could never touch us or our
property.34 As Heidi Hurd eloquently explains:
To be an autonomous moral agent is to have the ability to create and
dispel rights and duties. To respect persons as autonomous is thus to
recognize them as the givers and takers of permissions and obligations.
It is to conceive of them as very powerful moral magicians. By
recognizing their capacity for self-legislation—for the creation and
dissolution of rules that uniquely concern them—one gives meaning to
the historic philosophical claim that persons are free inasmuch as they
will their own moral laws. One very powerful means by which persons
will their own moral laws—by which they alter the moral landscape for
themselves and for others—is by granting or withholding consent to
other’s actions.35
If we think that what we are protecting is autonomy, then that autonomy is
best respected by recognizing that the consenter has it within his or her power to
allow the boundary crossing simply by so choosing. No expression is needed. So,
if I see my neighbor walking across my lawn to get to the street, and I think “that is
okay with me,” then the neighbor does not wrong me even if I never communicate
that to him. Similarly, assume that a man is awakened by the woman he had
intercourse with the night before performing oral sex on him. When he wakes up
he thinks, “this is the best alarm clock ever.” He proceeds to do nothing to indicate
his acceptance of this act. At the point at which he decides to allow the act, she
does not wrong him because he has assented. His autonomy is fully protected. In
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism, 117
PHIL. REV. 481, 500 (2008); see also Larry Alexander, The Ontology of Consent, 55 ANALYTIC PHIL.
102, 102 (2014) (“If we could not alter our normative situation as consent allows us to do, then there
could be no blameless dinner parties, boxing matches, or sex, nor could there be blameless trade of
any kind.”).
32
Cf. Chris Essert, Legal Powers in Private Law (Feb. 1, 2016), (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) (noting that without normative powers, we could only change our rights and duties
either by changing non-legal facts or by committing wrongs).
33
PENNER, supra note 25, at 78.
34
Shiffrin, supra note 31, at 500.
35
Hurd, supra note 14, at 2.
31
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contrast, if a man woke up and thought “What is going on? I don’t want this!” but
was too panicked to say or do anything, then he is wronged. It is the consenter’s
act of will, his or her choice that makes the consentee’s actions permissible.36
In defending consent’s core to be an act of willed acquiescence, some may
challenge, not that consent is some sort of mental act, but its exact nature and
content.37 For the purposes of this Article, I do not think it is necessary to take on
the question of whether consent is acquiescence, or a desire state, or some other
sort of choice. Certainly, these are important questions to be worked out, but they
still reflect an underlying assumption that there is some sort of choosing that is,
under adequate conditions of knowledge and freedom, itself sufficient to drop the
consenter’s claim right.38
The only distinction that is critical for any notion of consent is to distinguish
it from a request. A request is not just a permission; it is the communication of an
affirmative desire for the act. Consent is just a permission. Allowing my neighbor
to walk across my lawn is consent. Inviting my neighbor to my house is a request.
Similarly, a man might have unbridled enthusiasm for sexual intercourse or
conversely, may merely be accommodating a partner’s request. Although we may
think that, as a normative matter, it would be better if all sex were of the former
sort, that is not the question. The question is when the criminal law ought to step
in. The answer is that the criminal law ought not to play a role in either case.
Accordingly, any criminal ought to be wary of any usages that implicitly require
enthusiasm, as opposed to allowance.
To this point, I have argued that if consent is derived from our autonomy, then
we ought to be able to change the permissibility of the act by an act of will alone.
The corollary of this argument is that an individual is not wronged, and does not
experience conduct as a wrong, when willed acquiescence is present. Westen
illustrates the disparity between the subjective state and the expression thereof with

36
Accord Joshua Dressler, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going: Some
Cautionary Reflections on Rape Law Reform, The Sixty-Eighth Cleveland Marshall Fund Lecture, 46
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 409, 424 (1998) (“If a female ‘concurs in mind and spirit’ with the act of
intercourse, her interest in autonomy has not been violated. The attendant social harm of rape is
absent.”) (citations omitted).
37
Cf. Douglas N. Husak & George C. Thomas III, Rapes Without Rapists: Consent and
Reasonable Mistake, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 86, 90 (2001) (“The foremost challenge in defending a
mentalistic conception is to identify the exact state of mind that consent is.”).
38
Larry Alexander has a point when he maintains that acquiescence may be too weak in that
one may acquiesce to conduct to which one objects but one knows one cannot stop. Alexander, supra
note 31, at 108. He offers “waiving one’s right to object.” Id. My only worry about Alexander’s
formulation is that people often don’t take Hohfeldian relations to be the object of their intentions.
They simply think, “this is okay with me.” They choose to allow it. But if we understand that that is
the shift in normative relations we are after, we can work out the semantic details later.
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the cases of Burnham and Bink.39 Burnham was forced by her husband to work as
a prostitute. She expressed consent, but she did not assent. In contrast, the
complainant in Bink was a fellow inmate of Bink’s in a New York jail. After
complaining to the police of being forced to engage in sexual acts, he refused
protection, asking instead for the police to surveil the next incident. He expressed
a lack of consent to Bink, but assented. Indeed, the court found that the
complainant’s subjective assent prevented a conviction for rape. In both these
cases, then, the internal state better indicated how the victim experienced the
interaction with the defendant. Burnham felt wronged; Bink’s victim did not. The
reason to think consent is more like abandonment than promising, then, is that we
think the internal choice view respects the autonomy that grounds consent and that
this view reflects when the putative victim experiences that she is or is not
wronged.
2. The Willed Acquiescence View Is Adopted by Tort Law
It bears noting that consent is a normative power that extends beyond sexual
assault, and that we ought to see our view of it as implicating not only other
crimes, but also the law of torts. With respect to tort law, Tentative Draft No. 1 of
the Restatement (Third) of Torts likewise proposes a subjective state for consent.
It proposes:
§ 112. Actual Consent
A person actually consents to an actor’s otherwise tortious conduct if the
person is subjectively willing for that conduct to occur. Actual consent
need not be communicated to the actor to be effective. It can be express
or can be inferred from the facts.40
The Restatement (Second) of Torts currently endorses the view that this
subjective, not expressed, assent is sufficient to be effective.41 Consider
Illustration 2 to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 49 (notably the Restatement
(Second) employs “assent” for an expression of consent):
2. Upon the recommendation of A, his doctor, B assents to an operation
for the removal of a septum from his nose. Nothing whatever is said
about performing a tonsillectomy. Actually B has had trouble with his
39
WESTEN, supra note 17, at 139–60 (discussing People v. Burnham, 176 Cal. App. 3d 1134,
1144–45, 222 Cal. Rptr. 630, 638–39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) and New York v. Bink, 444 N.Y.S.2d 237
(N.Y. App. Div. 1981)).
40
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 112 (AM. LAW. INST.,
Tentative Draft No.1, 2015).
41
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892, cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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tonsils and desires that A remove them too, but he forgets to mention it.
A removes the septum and the tonsils while B is under a general
anesthetic. Although B has not assented to the tonsillectomy, his actual
willingness to submit to that operation constitutes consent to it and A is
not liable to B.42
Similarly, an illustration to § 892 provides:
1. A informs his neighbor, B, that he is glad to have all of his neighbors
make use of his swimming pool. C, another neighbor, without any
knowledge of A's statement to B, enters the pool and enjoys himself. A
brings action against C for trespass to land. On the basis of A's statement
to B, it may be found that he has consented to C's entry and that C is not
liable.43
Admittedly, the Reporter’s Notes indicate that there are no reported cases of
such instances of unmanifested consent.44 Likewise, Ken Simons, in his recent
survey of the law, was also unable to find actual cases.45 Still, the point remains
that a person is not wronged when he has chosen to allow the act. Whether viewed
as “willed acquiescence,” “choice,” or “willingness in fact,” the idea remains the
same—it is the internal mental action of the consenter that determines whether it is
permissible for the other person to act.
Notably, the Restatements are not presenting these cases as cases in which
there is no consent but also no harm.46 Rather, “subjective willingness” is itself
deemed sufficient to constitute consent. Therefore, tort law’s position is of
consequence because (1) it provides further support for my claim that willed
acquiescence is consent and (2) law reformers ought to be aware of what other
areas of law are doing and be cautious in adopting different definitions of the same
normative mechanism.
3. Why Changing the Grounding Does Not Change Why Consent Matters
To this point, I have argued that consent, as a normative power of dropping a
claim of right, is an internal choice made by the consenter. To make this claim, I
have employed hypotheticals that include walking across the grass and using
Id. § 49, cmt. a, illus. 2.
Id. § 892, cmt. b, illus. 1.
44
Id., cmt. b, Rep. Notes.
45
Kenneth W. Simons, Consent and Assumption of Risk in Tort and Criminal Law, in
UNRAVELING TORT AND CRIME 330 (Matthew Dyson, ed., 2014).
46
Cf. WERTHEIMER, supra note 11, at 147 (acknowledging that there is no “right to complain”
despite the fact that there is no consent)
42
43

2016]

CONSENT, CULPABILITY, AND THE LAW OF RAPE

409

another’s pool. Some readers may object that sex is different, and that it is grossly
insensitive to compare stomping on someone’s lawn to unwanted sexual
intercourse.
To carry the argumentative burden at this point, however, a proponent of a
different model of consent cannot make an argument about what sexual
relationships should be like. Instead, a proponent has to make an argument that
consent to sex is different in kind from other sorts of consent, such that how we
understand what it is must be different. Any argument that we should make the
rules of consent depart from what consent really is, is simply beside the point. We
first need to establish what consent is; only then can we consider whether
something other than that should be required legally. No one doubts that
unwelcome penetration is far more wrongful and harmful than trampled grass. But
the question at the moment is whether the mechanism by which sex becomes
permissible is different than the mechanism that allows one’s neighbor to walk on
one’s grass. Unless a theorist is going to urge that the background power
imbalance is so coercive that meaningful consent is never possible—and certainly
some scholars do make this further claim,47 I maintain that our understanding of
consent to sex should be in accord with our understanding of consent generally.
Although I claim that consent derives from sexual autonomy, shifting to
another grounding does not necessarily change the analysis. For example,
Tuerkheimer eschews autonomy in favor of “sexual agency,” an idea that includes
sex’s social construction and the power dynamics within and outside of
relationships.48 However, whether framed as autonomy or agency, one of the ideas
that motivates shifting to an expressive model is this: if the consenter does not
communicate consent to the consentee, then the consentee does not value and
respect the consenter if he proceeds. He treats her as an object, not as a subject,
who is the author of her own destiny.
There are two potential ideas entangled here: one idea deals with what we
take to be the “wrong” of rape and the other deals with the distinction between
wrongdoing and culpability. Let us take them in turn. If a man proceeds without
knowing whether the woman consents (but let’s assume that the woman is
assenting), then this is disrespectful, no doubt. This idea, though, is not
inextricably intertwined with sex. After all, in the illustration to § 892 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, C is disrespectful by using A’s pool without
asking.49 But is this disrespect the primary wrong in rape? Or is the primary
wrong that the boundary is crossed without the other person’s willingness?
Disrespect can be manifested in myriad ways, but violating claim rights turns on
See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 175–76
(1989); ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 124–126, 137 (1987).
48
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Sex Without Consent, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335, 339 (2013),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/sex-without-consent.
49
See text accompanying note 42.
47
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whether the consenter chooses to allow the contact. If we wish to respect agency,
why should this not turn on the agent’s acquiescence?
Even if we thought that disrespect was its own wrong, this idea would require
its own theorizing. Indeed, the necessary theorizing would have to include those
cases in which the sex was not only acquiesced to but also positively desired as in
the human alarm clock example above. If the woman in that example performs the
act on a dare and does not believe he is awake, much less willing, then although he
experiences no wrong, she disrespects him. But is this disrespect morally on par
with what we are typically criminalizing with sexual assault statutes? How far will
these cases go? What if during a sexual act one of the people fantasizes about
someone else? Is that the same disrespect? No matter how noble the motives of
those theorists who wish to move us toward respectful sexual relations, the
criminal law is doing a serious disservice when agency and respect are simply
trotted out for one crime without taking seriously the breadth and depth of the
claim.
Secondly, no criminal law needs to ignore disrespect completely either.
Recognizing that the core of consent is a mental act still allows for the prosecution
of culpable actors but it more appropriately labels cases where assent exists. In
cases such as Bink, attempt liability is available.50 On the facts as the defendant
believes them to be, the victim’s assent is not present. In contrast, though, it seems
inaccurate to deem conduct “rape” or even “sexual assault” when it is not
experienced as an autonomy violation by the victim.51
Another theorist who seeks to understand sex as distinct from other
consented-to activities is Michelle Anderson. Anderson advocates a negotiation
model that individuals talk prior to sex and “negotiate” in lieu of “consent.”52
There is much wisdom in Anderson’s thinking that first-time intimates in an age of
sexually transmitted diseases really should talk to each other before intercourse
occurs. And, Anderson cites statistics to indicate that many do.53 However, our
desire to advocate for free flowing communication, mutual respect and
appreciation, is still a somewhat different question than the question of whether the
individual consents. And, you cannot supplant consent with negotiation any more

WESTEN, supra note 17, at 161.
Id. (arguing that if a putative victim subjectively and voluntarily chooses an act of sexual
intercourse, she does not suffer the primary harm of rape). For the argument that attempts should be
punished the same as completed offenses, see ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 12, ch. 5.
52
Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1421 (2005) (requiring
“communication that is verbal”).
53
A survey performed after Anderson’s article indicates that approximately 50% of teens talk about
contraception or STIs before first having sex. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SEXUAL HEALTH OF ADOLESCENTS AND
YOUNG ADULTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2014), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/304008-sexual-health-of-adolescents-and-young-adults-in-the-united-states.pdf.
50
51
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than you can convert abandonment into a promise. We are asking how one can
drop a claim right, and one can drop a claim right through will alone.54
In summary, this section has argued that the best understanding of consent’s
core is that it is willed acquiescence—a choice to allow the conduct. Culpability
factors in at this level because we can reach a defendant who proceeds without a
belief he has his partner’s consent (and who manifests disrespect for another’s
agency) by using attempt provisions. The criminal law has resources to reach the
culpability of the disrespectful without contorting the contours of consent.
4. Expressing Consent
Although I believe consent is merely the choice—willed acquiescence, it is
worth pointing out two alternative views—consent as a performative and consent
as the expression of the underlying mental state. My claims will be as follows.
First, I find the notion that consent is simply a performative to be dubious.
Second, to the extent individuals adopt expressive views of consent, they likely
believe silence, under certain conditions, is sufficient to express consent. If they
hold the latter belief, then the troubling departures I discuss in future sections,
between what consent is and how reformers wish to define it, still exist.
To view consent as a performative is to take the position that by saying
“[some conventionally understood as consent phrase],” one consents.55 We might
be a society that believes “peekaboo” counts as consent, just as we are a society
that makes “I now pronounce you man and wife” count for marriage or “you’re
out” count for being out in baseball or “I promise” count for promising.
In light of these examples, it should be clear there is no paradigmatic way we
must express consent. Rather, we simply pick words or conduct. Just as society
might have chosen that green means stop and red means go, we might choose any
number of things to count as consent.
Here is why I think we don’t really think that consent is just a convention,
where we can just stipulate to the sorts of behavior that count as a “yes.” There
was and certainly remains widespread resistance to the marital rape exemption.
Consider two different ways to argue against the exemption. The first would be to
say that although saying “I do” could be the way that society generates a wife’s
consent to sex with her husband, this consent is impossible or inappropriate
because of the temporally extended duration of what she is consenting to. Just as
you can agree to mow someone’s lawn but cannot consent to be a slave, the
thought would go, you can’t consent to sex with your spouse at his whim.
The second way to object would be to say that it is just false that by getting
married one is agreeing to have sex with her husband at his whim. One court, for
54
The question of whether, even if consent is willed acquiescence, the law ought to require
something more is addressed below.
55
WERTHEIMER, supra note 11, at 147.
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example, called the marital rape exemption “a fiction.”56 Indeed, I think that most
people would object to the marital rape exemption, not because of its
unboundedness but because of its falsity. The problem is that the performative
view of consent does not have truth conditions. Whether sincere or insincere,
saying makes it so.57 If consent is a performative, the argument that she did not
mean it or actually consent is beside the point if she said the magic words. She
would be engaging in the conduct that constitutes consent. Consider the view that
if you say, “I promise,” you have promised even if your fingers were crossed. This
performative view holds that it doesn’t matter what you subjectively experience,
all that matters is the intentional use of a convention. Hence, any argument that by
saying “I do,” the wife does not consent to sex because she does not by so saying
indicate true subjective willingness is an argument that implicitly rejects the view
that consenting is like promising. Such a position is incompatible with the view
that consent is simply a performative. It is instead an argument that consent is
something internal to the actor and not just some ritual in which she intentionally
engages.
Now, let’s turn to views that seek to require both the underlying willed
acquiescence and the expression thereof. One might think the notion that consent
is “in the head” is too solipsistic. But even for those who look at manifestations,
we frequently take failures to object, under situations when people otherwise
would speak up, as consent.58 We might think that consent is an act or omission
that manifests willed acquiescence, such that failure to object is a manifestation of
consent in certain circumstances.59 Say (as frequently happens) my son kicks my
chair at the dinner table. Usually, I immediately snap at him. But one Sunday
night, I am feeling mellow and less territorial and it just does not bother me. Not
only do I think “this is okay with me” but I omit to object under circumstances
where ordinarily I would speak up. I think we would say that I could not yell at
him the next day because under those conditions, I had consented.
Notably, the concerns I raise below apply not only when one believes consent
is an internal act but also when one believes consent is an internal act that is
sometimes “expressed” by an omission. Although philosophically, I believe the
former answer is correct, I will not spend further time arguing between them.
Even if one takes a more ecumenical approach to the possible ontology of consent,
one ought to still be worried about the extent to which our criminal law might
depart from consent’s true nature.
Moreover, to the extent we are worried that individuals do not have a
legitimate basis for believing they have consent, the law can capture these actors as
culpable. That is, irrespective of how one views consent, culpable actors, who
56
57
58
59

Regina v. R [1991] 3 WLR 767 (Eng.).
J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 14–16 (2d ed. 1975).
WERTHEIMER, supra note 11, at 147.
I am indebted to Richard Bonnie for the suggestion of this formulation.
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consciously disregard the risk that they do not have consent, are still blameworthy
and punishable. And they are blameworthy and punishable even if they have not
wronged the victim when she subjectively chooses to allow the conduct, or when
she means by her silence to convey her acquiescence. More important to our
purposes than the mismatch that occurs when the victim consents but the defendant
remains unaware, is the victim who does not consent but the defendant who
believes she does. This Part is intended to establish that these divergences are
possible. The rest of this Article will focus on the more pressing concern of when
the victim does not consent but the defendant believes she does.
II. AFFIRMATIVE EXPRESSION MODELS AND DEFENDANT RELIANCE
Some codes and commentators maintain that consent is not an internal
subjective state, but is instead an expression. Proposals include both “no means
no” and “only yes means yes.” The “no means no” proposal does not say that
consent is presumed unless there is a “no,” but rather, offers a “no” as conclusive
proof of the impermissibility of sexual contact. In contrast, the “only yes means
yes” model—often called a requirement of affirmative consent—requires that the
consenter, by words or actions, express her willingness to allow the contact. I will
employ “affirmative consent” solely with respect to the “only yes means yes”
proposal, but refer to both as “affirmative expression” models.
One rationale for requiring an expression of assent is that it protects
defendants. Here, the thought would be that a defendant cannot know what is in
the hidden recesses of the victim’s mind. She can only know what he expresses.
Accordingly, if a reasonable person would think the victim is saying “yes,” then
the victim is, for all intents and purposes, saying “yes.”
This is the view of consent that tort law calls “apparent consent.” It is the
idea that if the outward manifestation says “yes” then defendants ought to be able
to rely on those manifestations. As the Reporters to the Restatement (Third) note:
The case law is not crystal clear, however, on the question of the scope
of [the apparent consent] doctrine. The broad view simply asks whether
a reasonable person in the position of the actor would believe that the
victim consented. A narrower view requires that the actor’s “reasonable”
beliefs be based specifically on the words and conduct of the plaintiff.60
The Reporters ultimately endorse the broad view, which holds the victim to have
consented no matter what the victim does or does not do.61

60
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 101 at 45 (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015).
61
Id. (“This Restatement endorses the broader view of apparent consent.”).
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Criminal lawyers should clearly see there is a better way to do this—through
mens rea. The law may simply ask whether the defendant recklessly disregarded
the risk that the victim was not consenting or whether his views were completely in
line with the facts. An external expression as part of our actus reus is unnecessary
when the very same thing can be accomplished far more elegantly by directly
attending to mens rea. That is, the criminal law would simply say that the
defendant lacked the mens rea necessary for the attendant circumstance of consent.
Because his belief was reasonable, he did not act recklessly or negligently vis-à-vis
the lack of consent. It is only because tort law lacks the nuanced element analysis
of the Model Penal Code that it converts a question of culpability into one of
consent.62
III. AFFIRMATIVE EXPRESSION STANDARDS, VICTIM PROTECTION, AND
DEFENDANT CULPABILITY
The current motivation for affirmative expression models is not the protection
of defendants who might otherwise be misled into violating a victim’s rights.
Rather, the idea behind “no means no” and “yes means yes” models is to be
victim-protecting. Consider two purported benefits. First, by stating the
expressions that prevent or allow sexual contact, the formulations provide clear
rules of conduct. Second, the hope is that rather than asking whether the “victim
really wanted it,” juries need only look at objective indicia (thereby potentially
bypassing difficult inquiries into the relationship between intoxication and assent;
and shielding the victim from at least some more searching inquiries into how her
behavior is “responsible” for his belief).
Affirmative consent standards are adopted in some states and hundreds of
colleges and universities. At the time of this writing, the proposed Model Penal
Code provisions are in flux. However, even if it is questionable whether the
version discussed herein will ultimately be adopted, the provisions suggested and
the reasons for them are illustrative of affirmative expression models and the
drafters’ rationales. Hence, rather than attempt to hit a moving target, this Article
offers an exploration of the sorts of statutes that rape law reformers advocate. The
following definition from the proposed Model Penal Code provision highlights
these expression models:
(3) “Consent” means a person’s positive agreement, communicated by
either words or actions, to engage in a specific act of sexual penetration
or sexual contact.63
62

Id. (noting that tort law lacks the refined element analysis present in the Model Penal

Code).
See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 29 (AM. LAW. INST.,
Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015).
63
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The Reporters provide the following justification for their definition:
In light of the difficulty in establishing subjective intentions, coupled
with the importance of encouraging both the frank communication of
sexual desires along with respect for that information when
communicated by others, consent is defined as an action, not a state of
mind. As defined, it does not require express verbal assent. But it does
require some indication of positive agreement, expressed either through
words or action.64
In this Part, I begin by articulating the motivation for a shift from willed
acquiescence to affirmative expression models. Then I note how affirmative
consent standards create substantively strict liability, or at the very least,
negligence per se rules. I further address issues with the fact that because the
criminal law is changing, not adopting, the underlying social norms, citizens may
lack notice of the law. Finally, I raise the concern that affirmative consent models
may be doing more than adopting consent standards; they may ultimately be
requiring requests.
A. Motivating “No Means No”
Let us begin with “no means no” models. Why opt for a model that defines
consent negatively in terms of proceeding in the face of refusal? Consider the
relationship between “no means no” and force in Commonwealth v. Berkowitz.65
There, the defendant proceeded with sexual intercourse despite repeated verbal
“no’s” from the victim. He did not use force or threaten her. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court found that the defendant did not rape the victim: “As to the
complainant’s desire to leave the room, the record clearly demonstrates that the
door could be unlocked easily from the inside, that she was aware of this fact, but
that she never attempted to go to the door or unlock it.”66 Now, perhaps reversing
the defendant’s rape conviction was correct given that the statute required force,
but that is precisely what has led to the push for different models. If Berkowitz’s
victim finds that her “no’s” are being ignored and the victim suffers frozen fright,
then why is that not good enough for rape? (Notably, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court did find that the jury’s verdict supported the lesser offense of indecent
assault. The jury found the “no’s” did constitute lack of consent, and the crime
that required only lack of consent was upheld. The outcry after this case was

64
65
66

Id. at 30.
537 Pa. 143, 641 A.2d 1161 (1994).
Id. at 148.
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premised on commentators’ beliefs that Berkowitz’s actions ought to count as
“rape.”)67
The idea, then, behind a “no means no” model is the Berkowitzes of the world
do not get to be morally obtuse.68 The law can prescind away from questions of
whether the woman did or did not want intercourse and simply ask the question
whether her behavior authorized intercourse. There can be a gap between that to
which the victim does or does not acquiesce and her outward behavior. But the
defendant is not entitled to claim that he thought the “no” meant “yes.” The only
question on the table is whether she said, “no.”
It is important to see why and how criminal law reformers have shifted to
these affirmative expression models of consent. Assume that a statute takes willed
acquiescence under conditions of sufficient freedom and information to constitute
consent. Berkowitz is proceeding with his conduct despite his victim’s “no’s.”
The traditional criminal law question would begin by asking, not just whether the
victim consented (the actus reus question), but what Berkowitz’s mens rea was
with respect to lack of consent. If a jurisdiction required recklessness as to lack of
consent—and recklessness is the default mens rea in the Model Penal Code—then
Berkowitz’s honest belief that the “no” meant “yes” would be sufficient to absolve
him of criminal responsibility because he was not aware of the substantial risk that
she did not consent. Reformers then could consider a lower mens rea, arguing that
negligence is the appropriate mens rea with respect to consent. This would mean
that Berkowitz’s mistake would need to be honest and reasonable. Even then,
however, the problem remains as there exists the argument that in some instances
even a reasonable man could believe that a “no” meant “yes.”
That, of course, is part of the dilemma. How can our sexual mores deem it to
be reasonable for a man to proceed in the face of a “no”? Relying on male
interpretations of female conduct to ascertain willingness is often a problem. Men
are far more likely to perceive sexual interest that does not exist.69
What comes next is a desire to create a bright-line rule. It may be that some
notion of willed acquiescence is what we think consent “really is” but that we wish
to create a prophylactic rule and empower women. The idea then is that men do
67
I am a good deal less sympathetic to labeling arguments. Determining the label is not
nearly as important as setting the culpability, harm, and punishment correctly. See ALEXANDER &
FERZAN, supra note 12, at 265–66 (criticizing the debate over whether something is “rape” and
arguing that unpacking crimes into risks to legally protected interests is more perspicuous).
68
See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 97 (1987) (“More common is the case of the man who
could have done better but did not; could have paid attention, but did not; heard her refusal or saw her
tears, but decided to ignore them.”).
69
See Coreen Farris et al., Sexual Coercion and the Misperception of Sexual Intent, 28
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 48 (2008) (reviewing the literature); Martie G. Haselton & David M. Buss,
Error Management Theory: A New Perspective on Biases in Cross-Sex Mind Reading, 78 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 81 (2000) (arguing that there are systematic errors made by men in
evaluating women’s sexual interest and positing that these differences were evolutionarily adaptive).
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not get to be “reasonably” insensitive and continue in the face of a clear “no.”
Reading just a handful of rape cases leads one to ask how a man could conceivably
think it permissible to continue in the face of repeated statements that the
intercourse is unwelcome. Sexual assault is a horrendous crime. The profound
impact of this extraordinary assault to autonomy and bodily integrity exists
irrespective of the defendant’s intentions.
The way to avoid mistaken interpretations is to set clear rules. As long as the
defendant understands that what is being said is “no,” it does not matter whether he
believes that the victim is actually consenting. The same is certainly true of an
affirmative consent standard whereby only “yes” via words or conduct can
constitute a green light. The idea is basically, that the defendant is sitting at a red
light until he gets the green.
B. The Consequence: Substantively Strict Liability Laws
In choosing to adopt a rule for consent, and one that departs from what
consent really is, the code risks imposing strict liability. The shift to “no means
no” changes the meaning of “no” from a factual meaning (evidencing
acquiescence) to a legal meaning (deeming sex impermissible). When the criminal
law says that “no means no,” it is not making an empirical claim. Perhaps the
consenter is saying “no” when she means “try again in ten minutes.” But the law
is stating that by saying “no,” the consenter has made it legally impermissible to
continue. The utterance is a verbal act that makes it impermissible to continue,
irrespective of the utterer’s beliefs or desires. Stop lights are stop lights. They
don’t signal whether opposing traffic is actually present. “No means no” is a claim
that the expression of a “no” renders the act impermissible.70 We should pause to
fully understand the effect of shifting the meaning of “no” from a question of fact
to one of law.
By giving “no” a legal meaning that can depart from its factual meaning, a
code adopts strict liability. This is because the code as stated disallows proof that
the defendant honestly, or honestly and reasonably, believed that assent was
present. In other words, if the defendant cannot introduce evidence that he
honestly and reasonably believed the woman assented, despite saying “no,” then
the proposed statute is strict liability as to assent. (The defendant can only
introduce evidence as to whether he honestly (and/or reasonably) believed she
communicated “yes” or “no”). Taking this evidence off the table is indeed the
very point of shifting the definition of consent.

70
WESTEN, supra note 17, at 82–83 (clarifying that “no means no” gives “no” legal
significance).
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In stating that a code is adopting strict liability, I am relying on the notion that
affirmative expression statutes would be substantively, not formally, strict.71 As
Ken Simons explains:
a substantive conception of strict liability and fault examines the offense
elements themselves, considers the interrelationship between offense
elements, culpability terms, and the relevant ultimate harm, and requires
a substantive criterion of fault that might not correspond simply and
directly to formal culpability requirements. Knowing possession of
firearms, or of burglar’s tools, or of matches, or knowing possession of
matches as a result of which a fire is caused, or knowing operation of a
gas-powered vehicle near a forest, are instances of formal fault, but not
necessarily substantive fault, since the legislature might only be
interested in these forms of “knowing” (and, in the formal sense,
culpable) conduct insofar as they create a risk of other harms.72
The concern with substantively strict statutes is not that they lack mens rea
terms. The concern is that they may punish nonculpable actors.73 Advocates of
affirmative expression models seem to conflate substantive and formal strict
liability in their defense of affirmative expression requirements. For instance, in
response to the concern that individuals may “lack personal culpability,” the
Reporters for the Model Penal Code project assert “once the penal code endorses
this norm as an important social-protection safeguard, culpability is inherent in any
knowing or reckless violation of it, just as culpability is inherent in the conscious
disregard of any other criminal-law standard that seeks to minimize risky
behavior.”74 Similarly, Anderson defends her negotiation model—a model that
requires a verbal “yes”—with the assertion that “rape law under the Negotiation
Model continues to require customary mens rea.”75 But formal mens rea standards
cannot rescue substantively strict provisions. I can purposefully possess a piece of
cheesecake, but pointing out that I possess it purposefully does not show any
personal culpability on my part. The law needs a reason for prohibiting the
purposeful possession. So, aiming to shift a social norm and possibly punishing
71
See Kenneth W. Simons, Criminal Law: When Is Strict Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1087 (1997).
72
Id. at 1087–88.
73
The use of “culpability” in the sentence above is referring to moral culpability or broad
culpability, not to whether a particular mental state element is satisfied. See generally JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.02[B] (6th ed. 2012); Douglas Husak, “Broad”
Culpability and the Retributivist’s Dream, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449 (2012).
74
See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 47 (AM. LAW. INST.,
Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015).
75
Michelle J. Anderson, Reply, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 314, 315 (Paul H.
Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009).
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individuals who are not morally culpable is a problem that cannot be magically
solved by inserting “knowingly or recklessly” in the statute.
The question then is how concerned we ought to be with a law that seeks to
create a “new” rule for consent. I think we ought to be troubled by this, but let me
first situate affirmative expression models within the broader context of legal rules
and the ways that legal rules might punish the morally innocent.
First, when criminal codes adopt rules instead of standards, these codes will
be under and over-inclusive.76 Assume that we only want people to have sexual
relations when both parties have the capacity to appreciate that to which they are
consenting. We could opt for this standard (for example, “no sex unless person has
the capacity to appreciate the nature and quality of the act”). But assume that a
twenty-four-year-old man is very attracted to a fifteen-year-old girl, who is
conversely attracted to him. She may not really understand what she is getting
herself into, and so she can’t judge her capacity. And, the only person who is
perhaps less able to judge her capacity is the man who very much wants to have
sex with her. Recognizing that individuals in this situation may very well get this
question wrong, the law adopts a rule: “No sex with people under 16.” This rule
will be under-inclusive because some sixteen-year-olds may not be able to
meaningfully understand what they are doing. The rule will also be over-inclusive
because some fifteen-year-olds may be able to meaningfully consent. But the law
sets a rule. Where the rule matches its background justification, it is a good rule.
And, if the rule is too over-inclusive, we can rightly complain about whether the
rule is justly punishing.77
Second, criminal codes adopt “presumed offenses.”78 These are cases where
the act that is criminalized is good evidence of the conduct that is itself wrongful.
So, possession of certain amounts of drugs is punished equivalently to possession
with intent to distribute at the point at which no one would have that volume of
drugs for personal use. Now, just as gun owners fearing restrictions from thenPresident-elect Obama “loaded up” on weaponry, perhaps some marijuana users
will increase their personal stashes if a Republican gets elected. Then, the
presumed offense would capture people who do not intend to distribute. A
presumed offense is arguably only justified if a jury considering the evidence of a
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULEBASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 31–37 (1991) (noting ways in which rules may be illfitting to their background justification).
77
DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 154–55 (2008)
(arguing that criminal legislation should be no more extensive than necessary and that there ought to
be a presumption against overinclusion); see also Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why
is This Right Different from All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 821 (1994) (advocating for a
higher degree of scrutiny for criminal statutes because “liberty from confinement cannot be relegated
to the status of unprotected aspects of daily life, subject to any regulation that is not utterly
irrational”).
78
See generally Frederick Schauer, Bentham on Presumed Offences, 23 UTILITAS 363 (2011).
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would be able to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that b. Of course, presumed
offenses make an irrebuttable presumption, so defendants do not even have the
opportunity to complain about over-inclusiveness.79
That said, given that myriad statutes exist that prevent a defendant from
arguing that an underlying fact or justification does or does not exist, it is fair to
ask why we should be so concerned if affirmative expression standards deviate
from what consent “really is.” If Bob can’t argue that Sally can consent at fifteen,
and Julie can’t argue that her stash of marijuana was solely for her own use, then
why should Greg be able to argue that Joanie “really consented” when she also
said “no”?
The difference between Bob and Julie on the one hand and Greg on the other
hand is the mismatch. What is morally wrong, and what the practice is on the
ground, both substantially depart from the norm the law is adopting in instances
where codes adopt affirmative expression definitions of consent. In asking
whether a “no means no” or “only yes means yes” standard is appropriate, one
initial question is whether there can be a departure between the internal state of the
speaker and the external manifestation. No matter how distasteful some may find
the contention that “no” may mean “yes,” it is still a question that any legislator
must ask when deciding whether to adopt an affirmative expression model. We
must know whether the departure between internal acquiescence and external
manifestation is possible so that we know whether a code can be substantively
strict and how potentially widespread the strict liability is.
The problem is, of course, that a man may make a mistake as to whether such
an internal state is present. He may believe that she “means yes” when she “says
no.” And the reason why he may make this mistake is that it is possible for a
woman to say “no” when she means “maybe” or “yes.”80 The 1988 Muehlenhard
and Hollabaugh survey of college women indicated that 39% had said “no” when
they intended to engage in intercourse.81 A later study found that men engaged in
79
Cf. Larry Alexander, The Supreme Court, Doctor Jekyll, and the Due Process of Proof,
1996 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 198–99 (1996) (noting that permissive inferences combined with the failure
of the defendant to produce any proof to the contrary may be in accord with a beyond a reasonable
doubt standard but when defendants are barred from producing evidence to undermine the permissive
inference (as in the case of voluntary intoxication in Egelhoff), a permissive irrebuttable inference is
created).
80
Even rape reformers admit this possibility. See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX:
THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 59 (1998) (noting “beneath the surface, in
the messy, emotionally ambiguous real word of dating, petting, and sexual exploration, ‘no’ doesn’t
always mean no”).
81
Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No When They
Mean Yes? The Prevalence and Correlates of Women’s Token Resistance to Sex, 54 J. PERSONALITY
AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 872 (1988). A later study in 1994 found a similar phenomenon in Russia
and Japan. Susan Sprecher et al., Token Resistance to Sexual Intercourse and Consent to Unwanted
Sexual Intercourse: College Students’ Dating Experiences in Three Countries, 31 J. SEX RES. 125
(1994). Admittedly, at this point, both studies are outdated. Kahan’s, however, is more recent.

2016]

CONSENT, CULPABILITY, AND THE LAW OF RAPE

421

token resistance more frequently than women.82 Even Dan Kahan’s recent study
wherein subjects were introduced to a stylized version of the Berkowitz case found
that “40% of the subjects, across conditions, indicated they agreed that ‘[d]espite
what she said or might have felt after, Lucy really did consent to sexual intercourse
with Dave.’”83 Hence, we understand that there are contexts in which people say
things they do not mean. A woman who takes her partner’s “no” to mean “yes”
may be accurately assessing her partner’s willingness to engage in intercourse or
other sexual contact. Similarly, silence may be misinterpreted. A man may
believe that his partner’s silence is acceptance or coyness when it is, in fact,
“frozen fright.” As Stephen Schulhofer notes:
If we consider actual behavior of real people in our world as it stands,
mistakes about consent, including mistakes about the meaning of “no,”
are undoubtedly frequent. And sometimes, in some settings, those
mistakes will be “reasonable,” even from the perspective of many
women.84
Importantly, the idea behind affirmative expression models is not to make an
empirical claim. It is not a claim about whether when women say “no” they mean
it. It is instead, the claim that a “no,” like a red light, requires stopping. Or that a
“yes,” like a green light, delineates when it is permissible to proceed. So, the idea
is not to make sure that people say what they mean, but instead to hold both parties
to what is said. If the umpire has the final say, then when he says “you’re out,”
then you’re out even when he gets the underlying facts wrong.
Codes that adopt affirmative expression models may be admirably attempting
to protect women. However, we do not currently consent under the presumption
that “only yes means yes.” Accordingly, a man might believe, or even reasonably
believe, that a woman is assenting despite her expression of nonconsent. So, too, a
woman might misinterpret her partner’s inexpressiveness and believe that her
partner assents. If these potential defendants are punished in order to cause social
change or to protect women by creating prophylactic rules, then we are punishing
individuals who are nonculpable as to what we really care about (nonconsensual
sex) in order to accomplish our goal (better and more accurate communication
about consent). We are punishing the morally innocent. We should pause before
punishing the innocent for the collective good.85 As Robin Charlow argues against
Sprecher et al., supra note 81, at 130.
Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in
Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 784 (2010).
84
SCHULHOFER, supra note 80, at 65.
85
Accord Husak & Thomas, supra note 37, at 107 (“In fact, a great deal is lost in the interval
between when the new law is passed and behavior comes to correspond to it. In this time period—
which could be several years or even decades—men who make mistakes about consent to sex that our
theory assesses as reasonable will be convicted and punished. And these punishments no doubt will
82
83
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Anderson’s negotiation model, “Are we going to imprison a generation of young
men, for felony rape, until enough of them get the message?”86
The criminal law must take seriously that to brand someone a criminal is to
stigmatize him and to subject him to hard treatment, often incarceration. This sort
of condemnation is appropriate only when there is a guilty mind. Death is an
extraordinary harm, but criminal liability does not fall upon those who cause it
accidentally. Moreover, in the sexual assault context, labeling someone as a sex
offender potentially subjects that person to a wide array of collateral consequences.
The burden on potential defendants is not minor. It may first appear that the
parties must simply expend further effort to get clarification.87 If on a particular
occasion “no” actually means “yes,” the parties will need to clarify their desires. A
man will simply need to wait to discern whether unresponsiveness is merely
coyness or frozen fright. This way of framing the tradeoffs might be analogized to
being stuck at a red light at high noon, with visibility for miles, and not another car
in sight. The driver may recognize that there is no reason that he should wait, and
yet, we require him to absorb the minor inconvenience of waiting for the light to
change. The benefit of clear rules of “green means go” and “red means stop” is
thought to outweigh the few seconds of minor inconvenience. With respect to their
affirmative consent standard, the Reporters for the Model Penal Code revision seek
to characterize the downside as just “arguably awkward efforts to clarify the
situation or (temporarily) missing an opportunity for a mutually desired
encounter[.]”88
However, that way of thinking presupposes something very important and that
is that we all know that “green means go” and “red means stop.” In contrast, the
entire point of these provisions is to create a new shared meaning. The man does
not see the inconvenience as simply one of waiting to see if the red light turns to
green. He may believe that a gray light means “try again.” Hence, the traffic light
analogies that are so easy to understand (and thus even I use them above) are
misleading because traffic lights rely on already established meanings.
Therefore, unlike tight empirical relations for presumed offenses or the
rulifying of a standard, affirmative expression models seek to change the rules of
be severe, since rape is a serious crime. This strikes us as manifestly unjust.”). Some commentators
appear completely unaware of the substantial cost involved in shifting social norms. See, e.g., Michal
Buchhandler-Raphael, The Failure of Consent: Re-Conceptualizing Rape as Sexual Abuse of Power,
18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 181 (2011) (“Criminal law can and should play a more active role in
changing social norms concerning sexual misconduct. Criminal law should go beyond merely
reflecting social changes that have already occurred.”).
86
Robin Charlow, Negotiating Sex: Would It Work?, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 310,
311 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, eds. 2009).
87
See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 47 (AM. LAW. INST.,
Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015) (characterizing the trade off as “an unwanted sexual intrusion” as
compared to postponement “pending clarification”).
88
Id. at 68.
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the game—rules that constitute a significant departure from the facts on the
ground. Red and green lights don’t mean stop and go in the world of sex. This
law reform is not making something clearer or taking an evidentiary shortcut.
Affirmative expression rules seek to change current practice.
Adding insult to injury is that ignorance of the law is not an excuse.89 In other
areas where a defendant may not remotely be on notice his behavior is criminally
prohibited, statutes are interpreted to require a specific intent to violate the law.90
We need to recognize that we are requiring not only that defendants rely on their
own moral intuitions of what is right but also that defendants know the standards
that the law provides. Indeed, faced with a similar criticism of her negotiation
framework,91 Anderson notes that she advocates for extensive education about how
and why to negotiate sex.92 This is a key concession because it means that a
jurisdiction cannot simply adopt a code that maintains “only yes means yes” and
then be said to justly punish those who violate it. This is one reason why colleges
may be able to adopt affirmative consent standards more easily than the criminal
law as it would take far less effort to notify students that they are required to
receive an affirmative “yes” before proceeding.
In summary, in contrast to the views of consent that give what the victim
chooses primacy, the requirement of particular actions shifts the meaning of “no”
from a question of fact to a meaning stipulated by law. In so doing, codes adopt
provisions that are substantively strict. We should be wary of punishing
individuals who do not commit morally culpable acts. Additionally, in the effort to
change sexual dynamics, jurisdictions must at least consider the adoption of an
ignorance of law defense or engage in substantial educational efforts to inform the
citizenry of the new requirements. When we say that to change the standard we
will deem conduct that is nonculpable “rape,” that is problematic enough. When
we do not inform citizens that this new standard is what governs their sexual
conduct, the state’s behavior is nothing short of criminal.

For a probing analysis of the tension between relying on social norms and notice thereof,
see Samuel W. Buell, Culpability and Modern Crime, 103 GEO. L.J. 547 (2015).
90
See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 614–16 (1994) (holding knowledge that gun
was automatic weapon was required so as not to criminalize widespread innocent behavior); Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 205 (1991) (holding that because tax law is complex, Congress’ use of
the term “willfulness” in tax fraud requires a specific intent to violate a known legal duty); Liparota
v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985) (holding Congress did not intend to criminalize a broad
range of apparently innocent conduct and therefore “knowingly” required specific intent to violate the
food stamp law).
91
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Sex as Contract, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 308 (Paul H.
Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009).
92
Anderson, supra note 75, at 317; see also Anderson, supra note 52, at 1433 (advocating
“widespread public education on television, in schools, and in the media about the ethical and legal
importance of negotiating sexual penetration”).
89
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C. The Possibility of Conceptualizing “No Means No” as a Negligence Per Se
Rule
There is, however, an argument that “no means no” is not actually strict
liability. It may plausibly be maintained that no reasonable man could believe
there is assent in the face of an expressed “no.” Part of this is an empirical
question as to whether women continue to express token resistance in 2016 as they
did in 1988. Part of this is a question of whether norms have shifted to an extent
where our collective understanding is still that “no” legally and subjectively can
still mean "yes.” Of course, to the extent that it is possible for a man to reasonably
believe a “no” is a “yes,” then the law would allow the conviction of a
nonnegligent actor. As Joshua Dressler notes, “[s]uch cases will be relatively few
in number, but it is improper to convict a person on the basis of the law of
averages.”93
Theorists sometimes seem to elide the distinction between strict liability and
negligence. In advocating for the “no means no” model, Estrich states,
“Reasonable men should be held to know that no means no; and unreasonable
mistakes, no matter how honestly claimed, should not exculpate.”94 If Estrich is
saying that reasonable men do know that “no means no,” then she is arguing that a
“no means no” consent rule is one of negligence per se. If she is saying that
reasonable men do not currently think “no means no” but they should, then she is
potentially advocating for a strict liability standard.95 She is seeking to change the
behavior of even reasonable people.
But let us assume that norms have shifted, and that “no means no” is
functioning as a negligence per se rule.96 It means that a reasonable person will
not believe that “no means yes.” There will still be cases where this rule is overinclusive. However, we might think that the cases in which a man honestly and
reasonably believes “no means yes” are dwindling.
Consider the infamous case of Regina v. Morgan.97 Morgan was a member of
the Royal Air Force. While drinking with three more junior members of the Royal
Air Force, he convinced them that they should all go to Morgan’s home and have

Dressler, supra note 36, at 433.
ESTRICH, supra note 68, at 103.
95
This question is further complicated by whether the “reasonable person” is the average
actual person, or whether there is some objective more idealized standard for the reasonable person
construct. See generally MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD (2003).
96
Cf. GUYORA BINDER, FELONY MURDER 30 (2012) (noting that even if felony murder
appears to be formally strict, it may be operating as a negligence per se rule so long as the
commission of an inherently dangerous felony poses a sufficient risk that one is at least negligent visà-vis death).
97
[1975] 2 All E.R. 347 HL (Eng.).
93
94
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sex with his wife.98 Morgan further claimed that they should expect his wife to
resist because she was “kinky.”99 Morgan’s wife testified that she was held down
by two men while each of the others raped her.100 The trial judge instructed that
the defendants needed to honestly and reasonably believe that Mrs. Morgan
consented, essentially requiring only negligence as to the element of consent.101
However, the House of Lords found that rape requires recklessness as to consent
and thus an honest belief (however unreasonable) that consent existed would be
sufficient to negate the requisite mens rea.102 However, the House of Lords also
dismissed the appeal under Section 2(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act of 1968,
essentially holding that the jury would have convicted in any event.103 This latter
ruling required implicit reasoning that if the jury found that the defendants did not
honestly and reasonably believe Mrs. Morgan consented then it is easy to infer that
the defendants did not even honestly hold the belief that Mrs. Morgan
consented.104
In Morgan, we are tempted to say that no reasonable man would take Mrs.
Morgan’s behavior as evidence of consent. Of course, this still means that “no
means no” is acting as a negligence per se rule. It is saying that it is unreasonable
to believe that a woman “means yes” though she expresses “no.” It bears noting
that adopting such a rule goes against the generally subjectivist position of the
criminal law.105 The criminal law generally seeks to punish only those who are, at
the very least, consciously disregarding the risk of the harm. Moreover, liability
for negligence is problematic because it has the potential to punish individuals
despite the lack of a capacity to meet the objective standard106 and because it is
questionable whether failure to exercise one’s capacities is always, or ever,
culpable.107 Although some scholars have argued for negligence standards because
Id.
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 349.
102
Id. at 347.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (setting recklessness as the default culpability); Elonis v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (interpreting a statute to require at least recklessness as the
common law presumption of mens rea requires a subjectively culpable mind).
106
For instance, the MPC does not individualize the reasonable person test to take into account
the defendant’s IQ. This means that a defendant who lacks the ability to understand the risk will be
punished.
107
Many theorists call into question liability for negligence. Some maintain that because
failures of memory, inattentiveness, and the like are not culpable, liability is not appropriate.
ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 12, ch. 3; Michael S. Moore & Heidi M. Hurd, Punishing the
Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL.
147 (2011). Others seek to limit negligence to a form of culpable indifference. See Kenneth W.
98
99
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men are more likely to be negligent with respect to sexual consent than with
respect to other factual judgments,108 the concerns on the other side of the balance
must also be taken into account. The branding and collateral consequences that
may result from any sexual assault conviction are severe, and indeed, far more
severe than many other criminal offenses. Since it is possible to be labeled a sex
offender in perpetuity for having urinated in public,109 any legislator must take into
account the extensive collateral consequences that may attach to being deemed to
have had sex with someone without her consent.
Indeed, a negligence per se rule will exacerbate some problems with
punishing for negligence. Recall that one rationale for such a per se rule is that it
prevents the subjectivization and contextualization of the reasonable person
standard in ways that undermine equality. The criminal law thereby avoids the
“reasonable drunk frat boy” assessment of reasonableness.110 (Criminal law has
not gone that far, but you see the point.) However, because the law does not ask
the negligence question, it will not accommodate individuation of the reasonable
person standard that individuals might wholeheartedly agree is appropriate.
Indeed, when tort law fails to subjectivize the reasonable person standard, it creates
pockets of strict liability, as it holds individuals liable who lacked the capacity to
meet the required standard. That is, if in Vaughn v. Menlove,111 the defendant who
sought the “stupid farmer test” (as I was taught in Torts) was, if believed, being as
smart as he could be. If he is blamed for failing to meet an objective standard he
lacks the capacity to meet, then he is being held strictly liable.112 If one of
Simons, Does Punishment for ‘Culpable Indifference’ Simply Punish for ‘Bad Character’?
Examining the Requisite Connection Between Mens Rea and Actus Reus, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L REV. 219
(2002); VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY ch. 9 (2005); Peter Westen, Individualizing the
Reasonable Person in Criminal Law, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 137 (2008).
108
Andrew E. Taslitz, Self-Deception and Rape Law Reform, in CRIMINAL LAW
CONVERSATIONS 305, 305 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009) (“What
justifies simple negligence liability for a very serious crime? One answer, I argue, is this: the male capacity for
self-deception in sexual matters and the special moral evil it entails.”).
109
Chanakya Sethi, The Ridiculous Laws That Put People on the Sex Offender List, SLATE (Aug. 12 2014
11:41AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/08/mapped_sex_offender_registry_laws_on
_statutory_rape_public_urination_and.html (mapping at least twelve states that require sex offender registry for
public urination).
110
Paul H. Robinson, The Modern General Part: Three Illusions, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY:
DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 77, 91 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002) (arguing
“criminal law theory has yet to find a principle that will convincingly distinguish the characteristics
that ought to be included from those that ought to be excluded when individualizing the reasonable
person standard”).
111
(1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492.
112
Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Confused Culpability, Contrived Causation,
and the Collapse of Tort Theory, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 406, 408–
409 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014) (“When being the best that you can be is simply not good enough for
tort law, there’s a name for that—strict liability.”).
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Morgan’s underlings had a very low IQ, should we be equally willing to condemn
his conduct?113
In summary, even if “no means no” is not a rule of strict liability, it still runs
against criminal law principles to the extent that it reaches punishment of the
negligent. The criminal law has been reluctant to brand individuals as criminals
when they have merely failed to act reasonably. Negligence per se rules, which
evade individuation, also threaten to reintroduce strict liability standards.
D. Blurring Consent and Requests
A final concern is how the “only yes means yes” model conflates consent with
a request. That is, affirmative consent standards may actually change the subject.
They may not be about consent at all.
Return again to my neighbor who walks across my lawn. No one wants her
neighbor to walk across the lawn. It trashes the grass. But sometimes being
neighborly is allowing one’s neighbor to walk on one’s grass.
Requests are more than consent. Requests give another person a positive
reason to do an action while simultaneously dropping a claim right via consent. A
dinner party invitation both changes a trespass into a permissible entering of the
home, while providing a positive reason, “Please come dine with me!”
How does this work in the context of sex? Well, unbridled enthusiasm—
“Give it to me, baby”—is a request. Consent requires far less. It might be “yes,”
“okay,” or perhaps even “whatever.” Uncharitably construed, consent makes for
permissible, bad sex—whereas requests make for ideal, good sex.
Now, although commentators sometimes acknowledge that they aren’t
seeking ideal sex,114 the dialogues they imagine run roughshod over the
consent/request distinction. For instance, for her negotiation model, Anderson
claims that individuals might ask what the other wants.115 But wanting, desiring,
and welcoming, are not consenting. They require more. Even more apparent is
Anderson’s adoption of a request requirement when she states, “Penetration
requires an assessment of active desire.”116
It is hard to see this section as anything but (at best) a defense of bad sex. But
our understanding of what consent is ought not to be contorted because we aim for
individuals to have healthy, loving respectful relationships. I also think we should
be careful in condemning all cases of mere consent as bad.
The Model Penal Code is generally reluctant to individualize the reasonable person test to
include intelligence. See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02.
114
See Anderson, supra note 52, at 1423 (“The law cannot and should not criminalize all less
than ideal penetration. Humans will at times choose to engage in sex for distasteful and sometimes
odious reasons.”).
115
Id. at 1424.
116
Anderson, supra note 75, at 315.
113
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Imagine that Kelly is going for her black belt in karate. She asks her husband,
Steve, a blue belt, to spar with her so that she can practice. He does not feel like it.
He has a rough day at work; he has a bit of a headache; and he knows that Kelly is
going to physically injure him (at least a bit). Steve does not welcome, want, or
desire to spar with Kelly, but he loves her and so he will go along. I do not think
that anyone would think that Steve should not be able to make it permissible for
Kelly to spar with him simply because he is not enthusiastic about it.
Or imagine that after consenting to spar with Kelly, Steve becomes very
aroused. Kelly is not up to intercourse. Perhaps she will decide to satisfy Steve’s
desires manually. She may clearly see this as something that she does not want,
but she is willing to do. (Indeed, teenagers who aim to preserve their technical
virginity may opt for activities short of sex. These may be concessions by both
parties in different ways. It is hard to see such bargaining as conduct to be
discouraged.) Both Kelly and Steve consent to the others’ desired contact though
they do not desire it. Neither set of contacts seems wrong, much less and an
appropriate concern of the criminal law.
In any individual case, consent may mark ideal or nonideal conditions.
Ultimately, however, the criminal law ought not to step in to regulate and require
requests over and above consent. Affirmative consent models threaten to do just
that.
IV. DRAFTING A CODE
To this point, I have focused on the problematic disparities between what
consent is (willed acquiescence) and more prophylactic affirmative expression
models. In this Part, I aim to address complexities that arise when such provisions
become part of a criminal code. I begin by arguing that standing alone, “no means
no” will be problematically under-inclusive in capturing culpable actors. I then
note that “only yes means yes” provisions will be problematic because they rely on
conduct that is sufficiently ambiguous that the new meaning a code seeks to
establish cannot be created. If only “yes” means “yes,” then criminal codes might
need to require explicit expressions. I then raise problems with grading affirmative
consent provisions. As noted in the previous Part, these provisions may capture
negligence or strict liability. When these provisions are situated within a criminal
code, it raises problems of over and under punishment, as well as the grouping of
individuals with significantly disparate levels of blameworthiness. Finally, I
suggest that one way of blunting some of the worries with strict liability or
negligence per se provisions would be through an affirmative defense.
A. The Under-Inclusiveness of “No Means No”
To this point I have argued that from a potential defendant’s perspective there
are tremendous downsides to a “no means no” model. In asking whether they are
worth it, we might look to whether a “no means no” model is truly sufficient to do
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what we want it to do—protect the victim. The problem with a “no means no”
model is that a statutory scheme that prohibited sex by force, threat, or in the face
of a “no” would still be woefully under-inclusive in capturing some culpable
actors. Imagine that a man gropes a women on a subway. He does not use force,
threat, or get a “no,” but his conduct is most certainly a crime. The reason it is a
crime is that he does not harbor any belief whatsoever that she is willing to have
the contact occur. Under those circumstances, the default between strangers is
most certainly that sexual contacts are unwelcome.
Indeed, the assumption that the default in all circumstances should be a “no”
is clearly part of the court’s rationale in New Jersey’s landmark M.T.S. case.117
There, the court held that the legislature had not adopted the Model Penal Code’s
definitions of rape, but had instead sought to bring rape in line with assault and
battery law.118 “Thus, just as any unauthorized touching is a crime under
traditional laws of assault and battery, so is any unauthorized sexual contact a
crime under the reformed law of criminal sexual contact, and so is any
unauthorized sexual penetration a crime under the reformed law of sexual
assault.”119
Notice then that although a “no means no” standard may protect against
unreasonable men, it does not protect against flagrant nonconsensual contacts.
Instead, an unwillingness standard, where one simply asks whether the defendant
honestly believed the woman willingly acquiesced to the contact, would better
protect the rights of victims.
Notably, one version of the proposed Model Penal Code provisions leaves
such a gap. The man who knows that a woman does not consent is only guilty of a
misdemeanor so long as she does not utter the word “no” and he does not use force
or deception. Avoiding what consent is and turning instead to refusal fails to
protect the woman who is too afraid to speak up. Indeed, this gap is all the more
prominent when one considers that these models likewise apply to sexual contacts.
A man who knows that groping a woman on a subway is unwelcome contact will
be guilty only of a petty misdemeanor because she did not refuse to consent.120
B. Is That a “Yes”?
With the gaps caused by “no means no,” it is no wonder that scholars are
advocating for affirmative consent standards. The default is “no.” The defendant
must wait for a “yes.”
117
State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992). M.T.S. also read the force requirement out
of the statute, but that is neither here nor there for our purposes.
118
Id. at 1276.
119
Id.
120
MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.6(2)(c) and (3) (AM.
LAW. INST., Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015).
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Affirmative consent standards are not simply victim-protecting because they
offer clear rules for the morally obtuse. They are purportedly victim-protecting
because they prevent a searching inquiry into the victim’s state of mind.121 To the
extent that the search for victim consent has been an avenue for unfair exploration
and exposure of a victim’s sexual past, it is easy to see the benevolent desire to
spare a victim from this inquiry. If the only question is what she said and not what
she meant, then say the reformers, we need not delve into the hidden recesses of
her mind, but merely look superficially at her actions.
If only that were true. This returns us to the distinction we must draw
between words and actions. Some words are like stop lights. They have clear
meanings (or at least can be easily stipulated to have legal meanings, such as “I
do”). Some actions will also count, such as nodding one’s head. But many actions
are ambiguous. Moreover, the law of consent is not the law of penetration. It
applies to torts. And it applies to intimacies short of sex itself.
Here is a statement I take to be rather uncontroversial: Kissing another person
does not unambiguously signify that one wants to have one’s rear end grabbed.
While Albert may strongly desire that Beatrice grab his rear, Chuck may only
desire to kiss Denise and may absolutely not wish to be grabbed in any other way.
Conduct can simply be ambiguous as to whether further intimacy is desired. How
can Denise know this? She has exactly the same information that Beatrice has.
Indeed, the false promise of affirmative consent standards is readily apparent
when one considers the Reporters’ exposition of what can count as consent to
sexual contacts:
[The proposed Code provision] specifically provides that “words or
actions” suffice to communicate positive agreement. To be sure,
breathless first kisses or “stealing second” are welcome and cherished
parts of many consensual courtship stories, and are not intended to be
penalized by the imposition of a consent requirement. The “words or
actions” requirement in effect leaves to factfinders the right to
differentiate between a “stolen kiss” at the end of a promising date and
one stolen, for instance, by a total stranger while in line at the grocery
store.122
Beyond doubting the empirical support for “stealing second” as a “cherished
courtship story” (perhaps because “stealing second” seems to imply unwelcome
contact), the Reporters’ defense simply highlights the very ambiguity at issue.
Context certainly matters, but how do we evaluate conduct that is not intended to
Anderson, supra note 75, at 315 (“Scholars have criticized the traditional focus on
subjective consent as tending to put the victim on trial instead of the defendant.”).
122
MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 127 (AM. LAW. INST.,
Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015).
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convey anything? I would suspect that one person kisses another person because
he enjoys so doing. This conduct is not, in Evidence lingo, intended as the
assertion: “Please grab my rear.” It isn’t even intended as an assertion when the
person really wants his rear grabbed! We infer willingness from conduct, but the
conduct is not being engaged in so as to confer a message.
Notice then that an affirmative consent standard is not necessarily more
victim-protecting than a willed acquiescence standard.123 After all, if the question
is “what sorts of behaviors count as ‘yes’?” then the question is not “did the victim
choose to allow this contact to occur?” An affirmative consent standard invites the
creation of a social convention by the jury.124 Will it be “kissing means you want
your rear grabbed” or its opposite? Who knows? Are we remotely prepared to
designate the exact behaviors that count as affirmative consent to each type of
sexual contact? Remember that under an affirmative consent standard the inquiry
is not “did the victim want sex” or “did the defendant act reasonably” but rather
“do you, the jury, construe this behavior as meaning ‘yes’?” Indeed, anyone who
rejects my view that consent is an internal state and instead opts for the view that
consent is a performative must recognize that this means the woman will not be the
final determiner of the meaning of her actions. If the law decides that wearing a
short skirt is consent, then it is consent. If you think that is wrong—and you think
that is wrong because women may want to wear skirts but not have sex—then that
is because you think that it is what the woman subjectively chooses that matters.
This means that we should be concerned about any view of consent that does
not allow the meaning to be determined by the speaker. If we don’t think that
short skirts mean “yes” or getting married means “yes”—if we want each
consenter to have the freedom to decide which contacts he or she will allow—then
the consenter ought to have the final say on how his or her actions are interpreted.
See also Dressler, supra note 36, at 427. Dressler argues in favor of “no means no” and
against searching affirmative consent standards because searching inquiries into the victim’s behavior
may not be victim-protective:
[An affirmative consent standard] hardly makes life easier for the complainant at the
criminal trial. In the absence of a straightforward “yes” or “no,” the parties will have to
explicitly describe the sexual events of the evening, right down to every minute and
embarrassing detail. The issue will not be whether the male threatened to hurt the
female, punched her, or threw her down on the ground, nor will the evidence focus on her
screams, cries for help, or her efforts to push him off of her, all of which demonstrate
lack of consent. Such testimony is traumatic for the crime victim…but testimony by the
woman about how she resisted the male is far less embarrassing than the type of
testimony we can expect to see in the new [affirmative consent] world, where the male
will testify to every nuance in the female’s behavior, all for the purpose of showing that
the complainant gave permission, if not in words then in action.
Id. at 427.
124
Cf. Douglas N. Husak & George C. Thomas III, Date Rape, Social Convention, and
Reasonable Mistakes, 11 LAW AND PHIL. 95 (1992) (noting that under social conventions prevalent at
the time women tended to engage in nonverbal behavior to indicate consent and refusal, behavior that
would require reasonable men to rely on social conventions to ascertain the woman’s willingness).
123
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After all, recall that we can still protect the defendant against misinterpretation by
relying on a mens rea standard.125
However, to rely on what the consenter meant to convey by his actions is
really to give up the game. Because once we need to figure out what he was
thinking, what he was feeling, what he wanted, and the like, then we cannot avoid
inquiring into questions that look beyond the objective indicia of the situation.
Given that conduct is prone to ambiguity and interpretation, the only way to make
sure that we set clear consent standards may be then to stipulate the exact sorts of
conduct that “count” as a yes or a no. Indeed, Anderson proposes a negotiation
model that requires talking because affirmative consent models that rely on
conduct can devolve into a “no” model.126
These concerns are not hypothetical and bad drafting is rampant. Consider
Princeton University’s equivocation on the definition of affirmative consent:
In reviewing possible violations of sexual misconduct, the University
considers consent as the voluntary, informed, un-coerced agreement
through words and actions freely given, which a reasonable person
would interpret as a willingness to participate in mutually agreed-upon
sexual acts. Consensual sexual activity happens when each partner
willingly and affirmatively chooses to participate.127
The first and second sentences set forth very different standards for
affirmative consent. The first sentence allows the determination to turn on what a
reasonable person would interpret as willingness. The second sentence turns on
what the putative victim truly chooses. The multiple layers here—of what the
victim wants, how she behaves, what her behavior indicates about her desires, and
what a reasonable person would take her behavior to mean—create layers of
ambiguity and confusion.
It seems that the only solution that is going to give affirmative expression
proponents the clarity they desire is a shift to a more exacting verbal expression
such as Anderson’s. But such a solution comes at a steep price as these regulations
would stand in stark departure to how individuals actually negotiate sexual
contacts. Requirements of express verbal discussion will succeed in clarifying
what is required, but with two possible repercussions and a third complication.
First, the law will more significantly deviate from what individuals do. Second,
125
Larry Alexander points out another difficulty which is that if we are to take consent to be a
speech act performative the actor must understand her conduct as an instantiation of that
performative. See Alexander, supra note 31, at 103–04 (speech acts has an implicit mental requirement that
the actor understands that she is engaging in a performative).
126
Anderson, supra note 52, at 1405 (“When things heat up, then, the Yes Model melts into the No
Model, in which silence constitutes consent.”).
127
Rights, Rules and Responsibilities, PRINCETON UNIV., http://www.princeton.edu/pub/rrr/part1/ (last
visited Apr. 14, 2016).

2016]

CONSENT, CULPABILITY, AND THE LAW OF RAPE

433

ethically well-disposed actors can be caught within the web of a law about which
they have no notice. And third, we are still left at sea with what to do about
contacts short of intercourse, as even Anderson does not advocate that negotiation
is required for sexual contact.
C. Grading and Conflating
It may be that affirmative consent standards are here to stay, and that as they
are adopted across campuses, the criminal law will follow suit. If so, the criminal
law must consider how to grade those instances in which a defendant engages in
sexual contact in the absence of affirmative consent.
Let us begin by supposing that individuals who proceed in the face of a “no”
or the absence of a “yes” are acting negligently vis-à-vis the victim’s underlying
willingness to engage in intercourse. Those who do think negligence is culpable
must face a separate hurdle and that is one of grading. Assume that the defendant
is negligent—she thinks that a “no” can mean “yes” but it is unreasonable for her
to so think. The further question is how culpable the defendant is for proceeding in
the face of the “no.”
Typically, we expect criminal codes to grade offenses by taking into account
the defendant’s culpability. Roughly, a person who kills purposefully is worse
than one who kills recklessly is worse than one who kills negligently.128 Hence, if
a defendant violates a negligence per se rule, we ought to expect that the crime be
graded on par with negligence crimes.
The problem, however, is that the defendant—who knows he does not have a
“yes”—appears to be acting knowingly. After all, he is purposefully having
intercourse and he knows he does not have a “yes.” Hence, the negligence per se
standard is masked.
One reaction to the concern that these models will overstate the culpability of
negligent actors is to reduce the penalty. However, then the statute will understate
some defendants’ blameworthiness, and understate it significantly. That is, if we
set the penalty lower for violation of the “yes means yes” model, then defendants
who proceed in the face of silence with full awareness of the victim’s lack of
acquiescence will be under-punished.
Imagine Dan who is on his third date with Dana. Dan is a serial date rapist
who preys on women whom he knows will not resist his advances. Indeed, he
picks his victims and tailors his conduct to produce frozen fright. He is aggressive
in his foreplay so that by the time that he approaches penetration he has signaled to
his victim that he will not take “no” for an answer. His victims almost always
simply freeze.

128
But see ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 12, ch. 2 (arguing that purpose and knowledge collapse
into recklessness).

434

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 13:2

Dan does not have affirmative consent. However, if affirmative consent is
used in conjunction with other formulations (perhaps aggravations for force,
threats, and the like), then actors such as Dan may be punished too lightly. He
may intend to have nonconsensual sexual intercourse and yet his action is treated
as on par with individuals who may truly believe that their victims are willing to
have sex with them. The trouble with affirmative consent models, then, is that to
grade them appropriately to the negligent, they will vastly under-punish the
culpable. Conversely, to punish the culpable proportionally, the model risks overpunishing the negligent.
Not only then will the criminal law inappropriately grade one level or the
other, but it will conflate two divergent levels of culpability. If Albert believes that
Betty is not saying “yes” because she is unwilling and Carl believes Dana is not
saying “yes” because she wants to appear coy, then Albert and Carl both act
knowingly vis-à-vis their victims’ lack of affirmative consent. But, Albert acts
knowingly vis-à-vis his victim’s underlying acquiescence whereas Carl acts only
negligently vis-à-vis that underlying acquiescence. However, because this latter
mental state is irrelevant, both Albert and Carl will seem to commit the same
crime, subject to the same amount of punishment. Hence, this model fails to
distinguish between actors of differing culpability.
This potential disparity is all the more problematic when we consider “no
means no” rules. Most men understand that “no means no.” Thus, they know the
victim does not acquiesce. These individuals should go to jail for a long time.
They should be punished as felons. Indeed, even those who consciously disregard
the risk that “no” truly meant “no,” should be subject to extreme sanction. They’re
rapists.
The criminal law typically delineates between these sorts of actors and
negligent ones. Even if a legislator wishes to punish Berkowitz, even if the
defendants in Morgan were (in the light most favorable to them) absurdly
unreasonable, their crimes ought to be graded as negligent crimes.
Hence, if we punish the negligent appropriately or we provide lesser sanctions
so as to gently nudge and unstick the norm,129 we simultaneously fail to condemn
egregious criminal behavior deserving of a substantial criminal sanction. Taking
rape seriously is not simply a matter of worrying about punishing the innocent; it is
also a matter of appropriately punishing the guilty.
A final potential concern about grading is the problem of over-inclusive rules.
Unlike the other problems presented, which any code drafter must take seriously in
order to achieve a just and fair law of sexual assault, I take this argument to be of
more scholarly interest. Or to put the point another way, the additional concern I
now raise, I take to be a real concern, but it is a pervasive problem throughout the
Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 607, 624 (2000) (suggesting the possibility of slight punishments to unstick norms instead of
hard shoves the create resistance).
129
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criminal law, and may ultimately be unavoidable. This is the problem of how to
articulate what a just punishment is for someone whose only wrongdoing is the
knowing violation of an over-inclusive rule.
What do I mean by this? Let’s return to the red light. Imagine you are
someone in the Midwest. The land is flat. You can see for miles. There is not
another car in sight. And the light is red. Will you run it?
As Fred Schauer has explicated, rules are over-inclusive.130 They will cover
cases that go beyond their background justification. Here, red lights are important
for safety. But in this case, you know that there is no reason to wait for the green.
No reason except that the law says you should (and maybe there is a traffic camera
that will enforce that law!).
Retributivists who believe that individuals should only be punished for
wrongdoing and/or culpability are particularly troubled by over-inclusive rules. If
a woman acquiesces and the man correctly assesses that, should he be punished
because she did not say “yes”? (Return, perhaps to the alarm clock example.) He
has not wronged her or attempted to wrong her. But if he knows the law says to
get a “yes” and he fails to, should he be punished? And, even if he should be
punished for undermining rule of law values, should he be punished the same as
individuals who engage in sexual intimacies with women who not only did not say
“yes” but also did not acquiesce? Again, this presents a grading problem for the
violation of over-inclusive rules that is ubiquitous. Still, one ought to worry
whether prophylactic rules in the sexual assault context might be broader or more
over inclusive than the run of the mill criminal statute. Even if not, the worry
about appropriate punishment remains.
D. An Affirmative Defense?
To this point, I have argued that adopting affirmative expression models have
the potential to punish the morally innocent, or at the very least, the negligent. I
have also maintained that this problem is compounded by the fact that ignorance of
the law is not an excuse. It is one thing to try to change drunk driving laws while
simultaneously adopting a sweeping public campaign. It is another thing for the
criminal law to alter the text of a statute and cross its fingers that word will get out.
Criminal law theorists teach what they deem to be less than ideal laws every
day. And so, one question is whether the best thing to do is simply to stomp one’s
feet and gripe or whether the best move at this point is to offer a potential
compromise solution. Despite my deep reservations about affirmative expression
models, here is a potential compromise. Although I believe the criminal law ought
to require true recklessness as to lack of assent, I would urge, at a minimum, that
an affirmative defense be created if affirmative expression models are going to be
used. Allowing a defense for honest (or honest and reasonable) beliefs and shifting
130

SCHAUER, supra note 76, at 32–39.
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the burden to the defendant would lessen the impact of this over-inclusive law as a
code seeks to shift social norms.
As Larry Alexander and I have argued, when the law creates proxy crimes,
and is thus over-inclusive, one way to reconcile the need for a legal rule with the
desire to do justice in individual cases is to allow the defendant to show that the
rule ought not apply in his case.131 Constitutionally, rules cannot simply be framed
as mandatory rebuttable presumptions.132 That is, if something is an element of the
offense, it is unconstitutional to shift the burden to the defendant to disprove it.
However, given the Court’s formalist reasoning, so long as a statute is properly
constructed, the same thing may be accomplished with an affirmative defense.133
If “no means no” simply means that “no” renders it impermissible to proceed with
sex, such that consent as willed acquiescence is no longer an element of the crime,
then there is nothing to stop a clever legislator from adopting a provision that “it is
an affirmative defense to nonconsensual intercourse for the defendant to show that
he honestly believed the victim willingly acquiesced on this occasion despite the
utterance of the word, ‘no.’” This affirmative defense could then be proven by the
defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.
To be clear, I do not endorse this provision.134 I think a just criminal law
would require the prosecution to prove that the victim did not willingly acquiesce
and that the defendant consciously disregarded that risk. The criminal law should
only punish culpable behavior, and the state should have to prove every aspect of
that culpability beyond a reasonable doubt. Still, an affirmative defense would
make an affirmative expression provision less unjust than such a provision without
a defense.
V. ARE COLLEGES DIFFERENT?
The rampant adoption of affirmative consent models across colleges and
universities leads to the question of whether all the concerns that apply to the
criminal law apply with equal force to rules promulgated in compliance with Title
IX. I am extremely skeptical that provisions with low burdens of proof, inadequate

ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 12, at 308–09.
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
133
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
134
Indeed, I have expressed vehement opposition to burden-shifting on consent on a prior
occasion. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, A Reckless Response to Rape: A Reply to Ayres and Baker,
39 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 637, 658–59 (2006). In that article, I claim that burden shifts are
unconstitutional, while noting the existing Supreme Court jurisprudence might allow the shift
depending upon how the elements are formulated. Id. at n.115. To be clear, then, my views on
consent and my views on how burden of proof ought to work, both yield that this affirmative defense
is morally and constitutionally unfair and inappropriate. But worse still would be to have these
consent laws enacted without the affirmative defense.
131
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representation, and minimized hearings will ultimately be deemed constitutional.135
And I am additionally wary as the naming and shaming symptomatic of the
criminal law begins to attach to these findings, including, for example, the laws in
New York and Virginia that require colleges to designate on a student’s transcript
if he was suspended or expelled for sexual violence (under campus regulations in
which, mind you, “sexual violence” includes the touching of someone’s clothed
buttocks).136 Still, the question for today is simply is affirmative consent as bad at
the college level? The bottom line is this: Affirmative consent may be less
problematic in some cases, but it is hardly the panacea to what ills our college
campuses.
Here is what campuses can do that criminal law cannot. It can provide notice.
Whether it tells students not to plagiarize or how to conduct sexual activities as its
student, colleges can notify and enforce rules. They can include the materials in
their orientation programs, hold dormitory meetings, and make sure that students
know that affirmative consent is required.
More generally, undergraduate institutions are ideal places for setting norms
on how to treat each other. When, for instance, the University of Virginia views
itself as “Mr. Jefferson’s University,” it requires its students to go beyond the bare
minimum of decency. It fairly sets the norms of membership within its
community.
Before applauding such a result, it is important to keep in mind that though
campus rape has dominated the public’s attention, noncollege students are 1.2
times more likely to be sexually assaulted than their college counterparts.137
Solving rape on college campuses may be our focus, but it is only half the problem
for women ages 18–24. And those women who are not on college campuses may
have less access to resources and support than do their college counterparts.
Moreover, there are reasons to be skeptical of whether affirmative consent
standards can be successful even on campus. First, these provisions are absurdly
sweeping. They bar not only sex but sexual contacts.138 They cover not only
students but also faculty. They include not just first encounters but also married
See, e.g., Teresa Watanabe, Ruling in favor of UC student accused of sex assault could
ripple across U.S., L.A. TIMES (Jul. 15, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/education/lame-ucsd-male-student-20150715-story.html#page=1.
136
Jake New, Requiring a Red Flag, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jul. 10, 2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/07/10/states-requiring-colleges-note-sexual-assaultresponsibility-student-transcripts. Here, the motivation for the legislation is admirable. In Virginia,
Jesse Matthew was able to transfer between institutions without any indication of previous findings.
137
SOFI SINOZICH AND LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL REPORT: RAPE
AND SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMIZATION AMONG COLLEGE-AGE FEMALES, 1995–2013, 1 (2014),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsavcaf9513.pdf.
138
Some theorists are explicitly aware that norms for penetration cannot identically apply to
sexual contacts. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 52, at 1422 (restricting the Negotiation Model to
penetrative acts).
135
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couples. Each of these provisions is perfectly appropriate in isolation. But when
you put them together these provisions would bar an assistant professor living in
University housing from pinching her husband’s buttock without his first having
said “yes.”139 One might take this example to be “cartoonish,” but when the plain
terms of a regulation cover the conduct, we are then relying on “prosecutorial
discretion” to protect us. When regulations can be more narrowly drafted, that is
certainly the better course.
More importantly, affirmative consent standards do not solve the greatest
challenge to our college campuses which is the intoxicated “yes.” Besides the
general irony that a liberal agenda will ultimately lead to the endorsement of
profoundly conservative values,140 there is simply the question of whether any
regulatory body is remotely equipped to adjudicate these cases. The proposed
Model Penal Code does not criminalize any of this behavior. The drafters believe
that intoxicated “yes’s” count. Sex with an intoxicated person who says “yes” is
punished only if the intoxicants were purposely surreptitiously administered by the
defendant. A “yes” is all that is needed no matter how blitzed out of her mind the
victim may be. “[I]t is not merely difficult but rather metaphysical and largely
quixotic to attempt to distinguish such cases from the many in which alcohol
influences behavior that the intoxicated person genuinely accepts.”141 Even those
of us who do not shy away from metaphysical questions in criminal law can see
the concern here. Because college students drink and “hook up” with perhaps
more frequency than they attend class, it is the intoxication problem, not the
affirmative consent problem that warrants further thought.
Finally, if we want to instill different norms for sexual consent and to reach
broader populations, then college is simply too late. A 2014 study found that
nearly half of all high school students reported having engaged in sexual
intercourse.142 College students can only do calculus because they learned to add
in elementary school. Shifting the social norm requires paying attention to
teaching individuals to negotiate sex from the very beginning.143

I am addressing the perfect storm of sexual contact provisions, intimate relationships, and
affirmative consent standards in a current work in progress.
140
See Heather MacDonald, Neo-Victorianism on Campus: Is this the end of the collegiate
bacchanal?, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (October 20, 2014), http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/neovictorianism-campus_810871.html.
141
MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 67 (AM. LAW. INST., Discussion
Draft No. 2, 2015).
142
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 53, at 1.
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For the argument that rape should be seen as a public health problem that ought to be
prevented, see Margo Kaplan, Rape Beyond Crime, 66 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2017).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Consent models play a central role in recognizing and vindicating the victim’s
autonomy in choosing who will touch her and under what conditions. But consent
formulations do not operate in a vacuum. Rather, different formulations impact
what culpability a code or regulation is explicitly or implicitly requiring. The
criminal law has and should continue to take seriously that only those with a guilty
mind should be subject to criminal sanction. Accordingly, affirmative consent
standards ought to be adopted with care and attention to their potential to punish
actors without due regard for their culpability.

